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SUMMARY 
Fears among exporters in Belarus about the aftermath of EU enlarge-
ment have been exaggerated. Analysis shows that the changes in trade 
regime generally favour exports to the EU 25. Average tariffs have 
decreased. New standards have not become a severe obstacle. Anti-
dumping duties have not been applied automatically and remain a 
matter for negotiation. In any case, the ten newcomer states absorb a 
relatively small share of Belarus’s exports, so that the enlargement will 
not have a tangible impact on the economy. 
The introduction of visas by Poland has not yet drawn a new di-
viding line in Europe, but cross-border mobility will decrease if Poland 
applies stringent visa procedures on joining the Schengen area. In the 
longer term, enlargement will bring other benefits, such as improved 
border infrastructure, which will stimulate transit-trade flows between 
the EU and the Russian Federation. Western regions of Belarus may 
also gain by spillover from Structural Fund allocations in north-east 
Poland. 
Opportunities for increased cross-border cooperation are a great 
benefit offered by EU enlargement, but usually disregarded by Belarus 
officials. However, cross-border cooperation with western neighbours is 
currently snarled by confrontation with the EU, an eastward-looking 
foreign and economic policy, and strong centralization of power. Par-
ticipation by border regions of Belarus in Euro-regions remains nomi-
nal. However, it is well understood both in the EU and in Minsk that 
cross-border cooperation may become the only way forward in rela-
tions between the two sides. Implementation of cross-border projects 
can engage regional and local elites in EU affairs. The New 
Neighbourhood Programmes offer financial resources for cross-border 
projects, in which four out of six Belarus regions can participate. Let 
us hope the authorities in Belarus do not impede such projects, so that 
society has a chance to come closer to the European Union. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since May 1, 2004, Belarus has had 
common borders with three EU member-
countries: Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. 
There have been many discussions, in the 
last couple of years, about the possible 
impact of EU enlargement on the socio-
economic development of Belarus. Fears 
arose among government officials and 
state-owned enterprise (SOE) managers, 
born of insufficient knowledge of the EU, 
its policies and functioning. It was 
thought that extending the single market 
to the borders of Belarus would threaten 
the livelihoods of exporters to Central 
Europe and the Baltic States. The new 
conditions (and threats) are in fact 
threefold: introduction of common EU 
tariffs by the ten new members, anti-
dumping duties against some Belarus ex-
ports, as well as quotas applied by the 
acceding 10, and new standards (safety, 
environmental, etc.) applicable to certain 
products for sale in the single market. 
However, detailed calculations show that 
the conditions for Belarus exports to the 
EU 25 have generally improved. It has 
also become clear that the markets of 
the ten EU newcomers are not vital to 
the country’s exports, so that its econ-
omy has hardly registered any changes 
in the trade regime.  
Analysis by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has been limited to exports. A 
broader, more thorough look at the 
problem would add other factors to the 
impact. One less tangible, but major re-
sult is enhanced opportunity for cross-
border cooperation. New EU neighbour-
hood programmes and intensified coop-
eration in existing Euro-regions may 
greatly benefit western Belarus regions. 
In the longer term, there may be spill-
over of EU Structural Funds allocations 
to north-eastern Poland and eastern 
Lithuania. Furthermore, there will be the 
impact of the new visa regime for Bela-
rus citizens entering Poland. 
The paper sets out to make a 
broader assessment of the impact of the 
EU enlargement on socio-economic devel-
opment of Belarus, with the focus on 
trade and cross-border cooperation. 
IMPACT OF THE EU 
ENLARGEMENT ON TRADE  
Official statistics shows that the ten new-
comer states account for 8.3 per cent of 
Belarus’s foreign-trade turnover and 12 
per cent its exports (in 2003). Over 
70.4 per cent of that trade share is ac-
counted for by Poland, Lithuania and 
Latvia, which take 76.6 per cent of the 
export share.1 The fluctuating trend in 
this trade is shown in Figure 1. Although 
overall the trend is upwards, the figures 
should be treated cautiously. The sharp 
increase in exports by Belarus in 1999 
was determined largely by a new oppor-
tunity to resell oil and oil products from 
Russia to the Western and Central 
Europe. It is hard to predict how long 
Russian firms will tolerate this and it 
was most probably backed by inherently 
capricious political decisions. Figure 2 
                                                 
1 The data for this paper were published by the 
Belarus ministries of Statistics and Analysis and 
of Foreign Affairs, supported in some cases by 
the author’s own calculations from these. 
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shows the comparative dynamics of ex-
ports to the neighbouring EU members. 
Figure 2 reveals wide fluctuations 
in exports to the three neighbouring EU 
countries. In 2003, Poland took 3.1 per 
cent of total Belarus turnover and 3.8 
per cent of its exports, while Lithuania 
and Latvia took 1.7 and 
2.7, and 1.9 and 3.5 per 
cent respectively. Crucial to 
the analysis is the struc-
ture of these exports, 
which reveals how sensitive 
the trade flows are to the 
new circumstances brought 
about by enlargement.   
 Figure 3 reveals 
that the leading export to 
Poland in 2003 was fuel 
and oil (37.8 per cent, 
USD 16.4 million), followed 
by potash, nitric and min-
eral fertilizers (23.3 per 
cent, USD 10.2 million) 
and organic chemicals (15 
per cent, USD 6.5 million). 
The largest share of ex-
ports to Lithuania in 2003 
(Figure 4) was taken by 
fertilizers (38.8 per cent, 
USD 10.3 million), followed 
by fuel and oil (8.1 per 
cent, USD 2.5 million), 
timber (6.9 per cent, USD 
1.8 million) and non-
organic chemicals (6 per 
cent, USD 1.6 million). 
More than a half the ex-
ports to Latvia in 2003 
(Figure 5) consisted oil and 
fuel (56.1 per cent, USD 
18.2 million). Other sub-
stantial items included 
products of ferrous metals 
(15 per cent, USD 4.8 mil-
lion) and timber (11.6 per cent, USD 3.8 
million). 
Figure 1 
Trade between Belarus and the ten newcomer states 
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Figure 2 
Belarus exports to Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, 1995–2003 
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Figure 3 
Structure of exports by Belarus to Poland in 2003 
(%) 
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Figure 4 
Structure of exports by Belarus to Lithuania in 2003 
(%) 
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In general, fuel and oil products 
have been the major Belarus export 
items to the ten newcomer states since 
1998, reaching 33.5 per cent in 2003. 
Next come fertilizers (18.3 per cent), fol-
lowed by ferrous metals products (16.1 
per cent). However, the structure of ex-
ports to Central Europe has not been 
stable, although the main trend has re-
mained over the last three years. 
If fuel and oil products are ex-
cluded from the analysis, the share of 
exports to the ten newcomer states in 
total exports drops to 8 per cent. Thus 
the economic development of Belarus is 
not dependent on trade with the EU 
newcomers and so not very sensitive to 
changes in their trade regime. Calcula-
tions show that in general, Belarus 
would gain from the introduction of 
common EU tariffs in the ten new mem-
ber-countries. The average tariff, based 
on the composition of exports to each of 
the ten newcomer states, decreased from 
3.55 to 1.91 per cent, giving a calculated 
benefit of about USD 13 million,2 with 
traditional quotas imposed by the EU on 
Belarus textiles calculated on the basis of 
current trade volumes.3 This means that 
exports of textiles to the ten newcomer 
states will not be threatened by new re-
strictions. 
The major problem arises with the 
chemical industry. The EU applies anti-
dumping duties to several export items 
from Belarus, for which the ten new-
comer states have been a traditional 
market. These include Belarus (and Rus-
sian) potassium chloride, cal urea, poly-
ester tow, urea-ammoniac compounds, 
and urea. Poland has been importing 
about 400,000 t of Belarus mineral fer-
tilizers a year and the introduction of 
anti-dumping duties would eliminate this 
relatively big market, which gives Belarus 
producers low transportation costs. 
Spreading the anti-dumping duties to the 
                                                 
2 Estimates by Foreign Ministry experts based on 
data provided by exporters. 
3 Foreign Ministry information. 
Figure 5
Structure of exports by Belarus to Latvia in 2003 
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ten newcomer states will cost Belarus 
industries about USD 132 million a year.4 
Negotiations between the government of 
Belarus and the European Commission 
yielded an intermediate period, so that 
anti-dumping duties are not being intro-
duced until April 2005. No further 
agreement has been reached and it looks 
as if the Commission is not keen for po-
litical reasons to retain any preferences 
for Belarus.5 
Another negative consequence of EU 
enlargement may be the introduction of 
new standards and technical require-
ments. Two major export items may be 
threatened: tractors and tracks. Total 
exports of these in 2003 reached USD 
25 million. However, representatives of 
the companies concerned claim to be 
confident that their products can meet 
EU technical and ecological standards, 
such as EURO-3. Contracts over several 
years remain in force since the enlarge-
ment, which also stokes their optimism.  
These calculations may give some 
idea of the consequences of EU enlarge-
ment for Belarus’s exports. If the coun-
try can soften the potential impact of 
anti-dumping duties by diplomacy, its 
terms of trade with the EU 25 will im-
prove. Another consideration is the grow-
ing competition on the market of the ten 
newcomer states. Imports from third 
countries could put exporters from Bela-
rus in a difficult position, especially as 
Belarus is not a member of the WTO. It 
can be concluded, therefore, the Belarus 
economy will hardly notice any changes 
due to EU enlargement.  
                                                 
4 Estimates by Foreign Ministry experts based on 
data provided by exporters. 
5 Foreign Ministry information. 
Policy-makers usually omit an im-
portant potential benefit from their 
analysis: the preferential trade regime 
incorporated into the new neighbourhood 
policy. The EU has declared that trade 
relations with the new neighbours will 
gradually be liberalized, with the aim of 
establishing a free-trade area with them. 
The EU is ready to grant preferential 
access to its markets, but the offer is 
conditional on human rights, democracy, 
the rule of law, and market reforms 
(European Commission 2003). Unfortu-
nately, Belarus qualifies under none of 
these. According to a recent statement, 
the EU has excluded Belarus from the 
circle because of lack of progress in es-
tablishing democratic governance. This 
may lead to preferences for Belarus 
companies being withdrawn. 
Less tangible, secondary impacts on 
Belarus trade with the enlarged EU and 
on the socio-economic development of 
regions bordering Poland include the in-
troduction of Schengen visas to enter 
Poland. This would mainly affect the re-
gions of western Belarus and eastern Po-
land. Since the early 1990s, many Bela-
rus citizens in the border regions have 
been involved in cross-border trading, 
whose flows have been served by small 
businesses in eastern Poland. This cross-
border trade has become a significant 
source of income for some companies in 
Poland, and to a greater extent, Belarus. 
The planned introduction of visas has 
therefore aroused many fears. At pre-
sent, a Polish visa is not very expensive 
(five Euros for a single entry), and the 
procedure is relatively simple. Though 
still time consuming, especially for those 
not living in the cities of Grodno or 
Brest, but it has not significantly ham-
pered cross-border contacts. 
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The visa procedures that Poland 
will have to introduce if it joins the 
Schengen area include official invitations, 
proof of financial self-sufficiency, and 
bureaucratic routine at embassies. Cross-
border mobility will decrease significantly 
and cross-border trade be hampered. If 
the statements of EU officials that visas 
aim at bringing order to border cross-
ings, not at erecting barriers can be 
taken seriously, the visa regime will not 
have a significant impact on regional 
trends in Poland or in Belarus. Para-
doxically, a big decline in cross-border 
mobility came in the summer of 2004, 
with the introduction of protectionist cus-
toms duties by Belarus. Under the new 
rules, duties are levied even on a single 
item brought for personal consumption. 
This was meant to eliminate the shuttle 
trading that has been a big source of 
income for so many people in western 
Belarus.  
A positive aspect of EU enlargement 
has been development of the border in-
frastructure, including modernization of 
frontier posts and building of new ones. 
The EU attaches great importance to 
keeping its external borders transparent 
and efficiently managed, and has been 
financing modernization of its future 
borders via pre-accession aid in Poland 
and the TACIS programme in Belarus. 
New terminals and infrastructure are 
being built, which should help to allevi-
ate queuing. The trade flows between the 
two countries will presumably become 
more intense, although it is hard to 
forecast these, as other factors such as 
trade regime and business climate will 
be crucial. Only if the government of 
Belarus creates the conditions to make 
the country an efficient transit corridor 
for goods from the EU to Russia and 
back will the border infrastructure be-
come a significant factor in the develop-
ment of western regions of Belarus. 
Activities related to EU regional 
policy in North-East Poland, in particu-
lar, investments from the Structural 
Funds, may have spillover effects in Bela-
rus. The main aim of EU regional policy 
is to intensify economic activity in back-
ward regions, through infrastructure de-
velopment, training and retraining pro-
grammes, and development of small 
businesses. It is very hard to estimate the 
future impact of EU regional policy in 
Poland, because the detailed programmes 
and financial plans are still being 
worked out. According to an optimistic 
scenario, efficient action by the Polish 
authorities and EU institutions may accel-
erate growth in eastern regions and new 
businesses may also seek opportunities in 
neighbouring Belarus, where the labour 
force is relatively cheap and well quali-
fied. In the western regions of Belarus, 
people speak Polish and the free eco-
nomic zones that exist in the bordering 
regions may become very attractive to 
investors. If this optimistic scenario 
comes to fruition in the years to come, 
western Belarus will receive a strong 
boost from EU enlargement.  
EU ENLARGEMENT AND             
CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 
WITH BELARUS 
Cross-border cooperation in Europe has 
half a century’s history behind it. Essen-
tially, it entails planning, organization 
and fulfilment of joint projects between 
partners on either side of an interna-
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tional frontier. According to the Euro-
pean Commission, the main motives are:  
* turning a line of separation into a 
scene of communication between 
neighbours; 
* overcoming animosities and historical 
prejudices among peoples of border 
regions; 
* strengthening democracy and devel-
opment of operational regional/local 
administrative structures; 
* overcoming national peripheral status 
and isolation;  
* promoting economic growth and de-
velopment and improving standards of 
living; 
* rapid assimilation into an integrated 
Europe or approach towards it (AEBR 
2000, 8). 
Priorities include developing border 
infrastructure to stimulate trade and 
regular contacts of citizens, and benefit-
ing the environment and tourism. Cul-
tural, educational and business ex-
changes are also popular cross-border 
cooperation projects. 
Formal and informal cross-border 
cooperation between Belarus and Poland 
started in early 1990s. Relaxation of 
travel controls made it necessary to 
regulate flows of citizens in both direc-
tions, intent on exploiting trade opportu-
nities. Contacts later intensified among 
small companies, educational establish-
ments and NGOs as well. Interest in co-
operation grew on both sides of the 
border, stimulated by cultural and lan-
guage similarity, common history and 
positive attitudes towards neighbours. 
Cooperation with Lithuania was ham-
pered by the visa regime introduced by 
the Baltic States in early 1990s, and by 
a policy of distancing the country from 
the former Soviet Union. Official relations 
between the EU and Belarus have been 
deteriorating since 1995. Open confronta-
tion in 1997 led to a freeze on ratifying 
a Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment between them. After numerous dec-
larations, the EU launched a policy of 
boycott that lasted until 2002. Among 
other things, this cut the TACIS funds 
available to Belarus. The candidate coun-
tries followed suit, which immediately 
resulted in a slowdown of cross-border 
cooperation. The leadership of Belarus 
responded by intensifying political and 
economic relations with the Russian 
Federation.  
This situation is reflected in the 
Belarus trade statistics (Figure 6). The 
Brest and Grodno regions that border 
Poland and Lithuania (Grodno) have rela-
tively little trade with these countries. 
Poland’s share of the foreign trade of 
Brest is only 7.8 per cent and of Grodno 
9.3 per cent. The Lithuanian share of the 
foreign trade of Grodno region is 10.3 
per cent. Open borders with Russia and 
easy access to less competitive Russian 
markets have reduced the inclination of 
most Belarus companies to export west-
wards. Imports from Poland and Lithua-
nia have been restricted by protectionist 
tariffs, although the official statistics nec-
essarily ignore unofficial imports, of 
which no estimate has been made by the 
Belarus customs or other experts. Even if 
they double the quantity, the trade turn-
over remains relatively low. 
Despite the confrontation with the 
EU, Belarus has been receiving funds to 
finance cross-border activities since 1996. 
The major instrument has been TACIS 
CBC, which comprises 22.3 per cent of 
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all TACIS funding in Belarus.6 Twelve ma-
jor projects have been realized since 
1996, with total budget of 11.7 million 
Euros, for modernizing border crossings, 
for demarcating the border between Bel-
arus and Lithuania, and for ecological 
projects in the basins of Zapadnaya 
Dvina, Zapadny Bug and Neman (see 
Appendix). Two further projects are 
planned in the near future: demarcating 
the border between Belarus and Latvia 
(2.2 million Euros) and building truck 
customs terminal in Brest (16 million Eu-
ros). 
TACIS CBC had an important sub-
programme of small projects aimed at 
developing cooperation between local 
administrations of border regions in Bel-
arus (and Ukraine, Moldova and Russia) 
                                                 
6 The information on TACIS CBC in Belarus comes 
from the TACIS coordination office, Minsk. 
with local administrations of 
EU 15 or candidate coun-
tries. In 1996–2002, Belarus 
local authorities implemented 
ten small projects with a to-
tal budget of 1.32 million 
Euros. Five more were ap-
proved for financing in 
2003, with a total budget of 
1.12 million Euros. These 
were designed to create fo-
rum of cross-border inves-
tors in Brest, to learn from 
neighbours’ experience in 
development of inter-regional 
collaboration, to train spe-
cialists in transport manage-
ment and logistics, to de-
velop the agricultural econ-
omy, to establish a Latvian-
Belarus information centre, 
and for some other purposes 
(see Appendix). However, 15 
projects in eight years point to very 
weak activity by regional and local au-
thorities to avail themselves of EU fund-
ing. 
In 1993–4, heads of regional ad-
ministrations in Polish border regions ini-
tiated the formation of so-called Euro-
regions, to formalize somewhat and de-
velop cross-border cooperation with Bela-
rus, Ukraine and Lithuania. One motive 
was the availability of EU funds for the 
purpose. In 1997, Grodno and Brest re-
gions joined the two Euro-regions Neman 
and Bug, covering the whole border with 
Poland and Lithuania. Partners in Neman 
were bordering regions of Poland, 
Lithuania and Kaliningrad oblast (Russia), 
and in Bug, those of Poland and 
Ukraine. Since then, Belarus partners 
have participated in some common pro-
jects. In Neman, these included (1) creat-
ing and networking the Belarus office of 
Figure 6 
Foreign trade turnover by regions, 2003 
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the Neman Euro-region in Grodno (com-
mon budget 196,928 Euros), (2) creating 
a consultancy service for small-business 
development in Novogrudok, Belarus 
(common budget 239,600 Euros), (3) in-
stituting a training programme in cross-
border transport management and logis-
tics (common budget 175,200 Euros), 
and (4) regional development and envi-
ronment in the Neman Euro-region 
(common budget 989,560 Euros).7  
Officials from the Belarus and Pol-
ish sides state that Bug and Neman have 
had very low efficiency in attaining their 
declared aims, in particular in develop-
ing transnational cooperation (Komornicki 
2002). As mentioned earlier, activities 
related to cross-border cooperation have 
slowed since 1997. Confrontations with 
the EU, reorientation of foreign policy 
eastwards and centralization of power 
have hindered fruitful collaboration with 
western neighbours. Under the circum-
stances, collaboration with Western 
European countries is not a priority and 
relations with the EU have been antago-
nistic rather than just cool. Tense rela-
tions between Poland and Belarus in re-
cent years have soured cooperation. 
Every cross-border activity has gained 
immediate political connotations. 
Another reason for stagnation in 
cross-border cooperation has been strict 
centralization of power in Belarus. Unlike 
those in most European states, including 
Ukraine and Russia, regional and local 
authorities in Belarus have very limited 
decision-making powers and competen-
cies. Most strategic decisions to do with 
intra-regional development are taken by 
central government or require long 
agreement procedures with all kinds of 
                                                 
7 Data obtained from the Office of the Neman 
Euro-region, Grodno. 
central authorities. Furthermore, the 
country’s leadership has been very suspi-
cious of governmental linkages with 
Western countries, for fear of importing 
democratic ideas.  
Under these circumstances, any 
cross-border cooperation seemed to offer 
additional problems rather than new op-
portunities for local administrations and 
their initiative was eroded. Regional au-
thorities in Grodno and Brest, and Bela-
rus partners in general sought economic 
benefits rather than cooperation with 
their neighbours in the bad economic 
situation of the late 1990s. According to 
one Grodno official, responsible for col-
laboration within the Neman Euro-region, 
the higher authorities of the region 
‘wanted the money, but they did not 
want the project; they seek to solve do-
mestic problems at the expense of the 
partners; otherwise they just did not 
need any cross-border cooperation.’ 
Heavy domination of every activity 
by the governmental administration and 
lack of genuine NGOs and other possible 
partners for cooperation in Belarus left 
the country’s participation in Euro-
regions nominal. At present, Belarus re-
gions participate in four Euro-regions 
with the EU: Bug and Neman (already 
mentioned), as well as more recently 
created Belovezhskaya Pushcha (with Po-
land) and Country of Lakes (with 
Lithuania and Latvia). In the near future, 
Euro-regions may become the only way 
to keep at least some relations between 
Belarus and the enlarged EU alive. Cross-
border cooperation itself can be depoliti-
cized if it focuses, for example, on eco-
logical and cultural issues, giving some 
chances to engage Belarus regional elites 
in closer relations with Western neigh-
bours.  
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NEIGHBOURHOOD                                 
PROGRAMMES – NEW 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR BELARUS  
One of the main factors with an impact 
on cross border cooperation that also 
defines the benefits and threats of 
enlargement to neighbouring states is the 
EU policy towards neighbours. The Euro-
pean Commission proposed a framework 
in 2003 for a so-called New Neighbour-
hood Policy to outline future relations 
with the new neighbours. This underlines 
the importance of EU involvement in 
building fruitful collaboration with all 
such neighbouring countries, especially 
Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. 
The Union is keen to support the devel-
opment of a stable market economy, the 
rule of law, efficient administration, 
clean environment, security, and other 
attributes. Within this policy, the EU can 
go so far as to offer full participation in 
the single market (free movement of 
goods, services, capital and labour) with-
out membership (European Commission 
2003).  
In general, the assistance offered 
by the EU New Neighbourhood Policy is 
conditional on a country’s progress. In 
other words, the EU will not pay if the 
country ‘does not behave.’ This can 
cause problems for Belarus, whose poli-
cies do not usually meet EU expectations. 
The Commission has conceded that rela-
tions with Belarus will not be easy: 
The EU faces a choice. It can leave 
things to drift, which could cost the 
people of Belarus dear and prevent the 
EU from pursuing increased cooperation 
on issues of mutual interest, or engage 
and risk sending a signal of support for 
policies that do not conform to EU val-
ues (European Commission 2003, p. 15).        
The European Commission continues 
to work through the Neighbourhood 
programmes, which are planned to be-
come a basis for cross-border coopera-
tion between the EU 25 and its new 
neighbours. On the EU side, the pro-
grammes are financed by INTERREG 
(strand A), and on the other side by 
TACIS CBC. Coordination of the pro-
grammes causes some institutional prob-
lems: INTERREG is administrated by DG 
Regional Policy, while TACIS is a pro-
gramme of EUROPEAID. Experts of the 
INTERREG office in Poland admit that co-
ordinating the activities of these two big 
institutions is no easy task. The Commis-
sion has undertaken to create a single 
financial instrument after 2006 to carry 
out the programmes.  
Total TACIS funding of the 
Neighbourhood programmes for the four 
CIS countries may reach 20 million Eu-
ros in 2004, 25 million Euros in 2005 
and 30 million Euros in 2006 (European 
Commission 2004). Three out of five Bel-
arus regions are eligible to participate: 
Grodno and Brest (West), Vitebsk (North) 
and Minsk (Centre). The European 
Commission has defined three major 
programmes under which Belarus regions 
may receive funding: Latvia–Lithuania–
Belarus (7.5 million Euros for Belarus 
and Russia), Poland–Ukraine–Belarus (8 
million Euros for Ukraine and Belarus), 
and the Baltic sea region, designed to 
foster transnational cooperation with 
partners in Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Sweden, Poland, Norway, Russia, Lithua-
nia, Latvia and Estonia (7.5 million Euros 
for Belarus and Russia). Of the total 
commitment of 23 million Euros for 
2005–6, 6 million Euros were planned 
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for allocation in 2004 (Ibid.) It should 
be noted that the funds are not divided 
between partners on a parity basis, but 
for specific projects. This means that if 
projects from Belarus are greater in 
number and better in quality, Belarus 
partners may receive more of the money 
than Ukraine or Russia.  
Unlike the Small Projects pro-
gramme, where applicants and implemen-
ters were confined to regional and local 
administrations, the participants in 
Neighbourhood programmes may encom-
pass any type of organization. The one 
condition is that the projects have a 
cross-border nature and facilitate sus-
tainable development of a region. The 
priorities are formulated rather broadly, 
so that almost any initiatives may be ap-
proved, provided the applications are 
correctly written.   
The application process was to start 
only after a relevant agreement between 
the Belarus government and the Euro-
pean Commission had been signed. This 
was planned for October 2004, but un-
fortunately signature had not been 
scheduled by the time this paper was 
written. The delays may have been due 
to the unconstitutional referendum held 
in Belarus in November 2004. 
According to Commission officials, 
the procedure of application and ap-
proval of projects may take half a year. 
If agreement had been reached before 
the end of 2004, implementation of pro-
jects would have started in late summer 
or autumn 2005. Approval of a project 
by the European Commission is not the 
end of the story. According to Belarus 
legislation, the project will have to follow 
a registration procedure with the gov-
ernment. This is no formality: it calls for 
a pile of documents and the approval 
process may take one or two months. If 
the project is not considered to contrib-
ute to Belarus priorities of development 
or if the EU transfers are not qualified 
as ‘technical assistance’ according to Bel-
arus law (Presidential Decree 460), the 
EU allocations in Belarus will be taxed at 
a rate of up to 30 per cent. Actually, 
the problem of taxation of EU grants 
was one of reason why EU funding was 
frozen in 2003. Of course, the govern-
ment should monitor international pro-
jects realized in the country, but direct 
intervention of the state complicates un-
easy bureaucratic procedures and annoys 
our foreign partners and donors.  
In general, Belarus has great poten-
tial for cross-border cooperation. Firstly, 
there is no language barrier. Much of 
population in the western regions under-
stands and speaks Polish, while eastern 
Poles understand and sometimes speak 
Russian. Lithuanians over the age of 30 
speak Russian too. Secondly, the borders 
are not straddled by national or ethnic 
distrust, which international experience 
shows is one of the biggest barriers to 
fruitful cross-border cooperation. A posi-
tive image of neighbours in all three 
states is fostered by similarities of cul-
ture and shared history. Furthermore, 
Poles generally consider people of Bela-
rus as reliable partners; which is likewise 
important impression for building con-
tacts. The period of distancing from the 
former Soviet Union has ended in 
Lithuania, where people are now ready 
for dialogue and collaboration with 
neighbours.  
In the opinion of the specialists 
working for the TACIS coordination office 
in Minsk, the desire of local authorities 
and NGOs to cooperate with people 
across the border is quite strong. The 
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specialist skills available will suffice to 
implement small international projects. 
One problem in this respect is relatively 
poor knowledge of the foreign languages 
required to cope with EU documentation 
and project applications. The solution 
may be to attract universities as partners 
for projects. In the EU, this niche is oc-
cupied by consultancies that help to 
phrase applications in ‘EU language’, but 
there are no such services provided in 
Belarus, where the universities may be 
the key instead.  
Future years may see intensification 
of activity by counterparts in Poland and 
Lithuania. The financial resources of 
INTERREG (Strand A) are allocated only 
for specific cross-border projects with 
neighbouring partners. So representatives 
of regional and local administrations, 
NGOs and other organizations in Poland 
and Lithuania will probably be looking 
for such partners in Belarus. Although 
the money available for Belarus is far 
less than for new members, it will suf-
fice for some interesting and useful ini-
tiatives.   
Further effort is certainly needed to 
spread information about EU pro-
grammes to local communities, especially 
to explain long-term planning, program-
ming and strategy-building aspects. Con-
spicuous projects on the Polish–Belarus 
border, showing tangible economic re-
sults, could encourage other partners in 
Belarus to pursue cross-border coopera-
tion. The expertise of the Euro-regions 
may turn them into sensitive channels for 
spreading information and advice to lo-
cal communities. Belarus has a chance to 
join in European integration through 
cross-border cooperation. It should not 
be missed. 
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APPENDIX                                    
OF DATA FROM THE TACIS COORDINATION OFFICE IN MINSK 
Table A1 
TACIS CBC projects implemented in Belarus, 1996–2000 
(million Euros) 
 
No. Project Budget 
1 Building, delivery of equipment and providing of technical assistance for border 
crossing Kammenyi Log 
1.7 
2 Delivery of equipment and providing of technical assistance for border crossing 
Warsaw Bridge 
0.6 
3 Delivery of equipment and providing of technical assistance for border crossing 
Kozlovichi 
0.5 
4 Building, delivery of equipment and providing of technical assistance for demarcation 
of Belarus–Lithuania border 
1.4 
5 Euro-border in Brest 0.4 
6 Additional study of border crossings between the EU and the CIS, and Central and 
Eastern Europe, Stage 1 
0.2 
7 Analysis of legislation on customs and border crossing procedures at western bor-
ders of the CIS 
0.2 
8 Regional development and environmental protection in Euro-region Neman 1.0 
9 Management of water resources and environmental protection in basins of Daugava 
and Zapadnaya Dvina 
1.9 
10 Development of cooperation between Poland and Belarus in assessment and increase 
of water quality in a basin of Zapadnyi Bug 
1.9 
11 Improvement of water supply safety for city and rural population in basin of Neman 
between Belarus and Lithuania via decrease of water pollution 
1.7 
12 Improvement of specialists’ qualifications in development of regional projects of tech-
nical cooperation 
0.2 
 Total 11.7 
 
 
 
Table A2 
TACIS CBC projects approved for financing, 2003 
(million Euros) 
 
No Project Budget 
1 Building of truck customs terminal in Brest 16.0 
2 Demarcation of Belarus-Latvian border 2.2 
 Total 18.2 
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Table A3 
TACIS CBC ‘Small Projects’ implemented in Belarus, 1996–2002 
million Euros 
 
No. Project Budget 
1 Forum of cross-border investors in Brest 0.06 
2 Study of neighbours’ experience (Belarus, Lithuania, Sweden, and Denmark) in devel-
opment of regional cooperation 
0.25 
3 Training of specialists on transport management and logistics 0.15 
4 Creation and networking of Belarus office of Euro-region ‘Neman’ 0.15 
5 Cross-border information and cross-border contacts as a basis for development of 
trans-border region 
0.2 
6 Development of rural economy  0.09 
7 Improvement of efficiency of energy usage in hospitals 0.2 
8 Management of Euro-regions  0.01 
9 Organization of Latvian-Belarus information centre 0.01 
 Total 1.12 
 
 
Table A4 
TACIS CBC ‘Small Projects’ approved for financing, 2003 
(million Euros) 
 
No Name of the project Budget 
1 Enhancing of cross-border cooperation for regional development of trans-border area 0.25 
2 Opportunities of unblocking of tourism on river Neman: Baltic cross-border water 
tourism  
0.2 
3 Improvement of tourism and economic development in Grodno (Belarus) and Ladruva 
(Lithuania) 
0.19 
4 Concept of development of cross-border integration in the area of Brest (Belarus) 
and Biala Podlaska (Poland) regions 
0.28 
5 Management and marketing of agro-tourism in Euro-region ‘Country of Lakes’ 0.25 
 Total 1.17 
 
